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1 Introduction
The last years have witnessed an increasing interest in the international dimension of
taxing multinational firms. The current situation is characterized by a complex sys-
tem of bilateral double-taxation treaties applying separate accounting (SA) rules that
treat multinational affiliates as distinct entities.1 These rules, however, are increasingly
criticized by politicians and researchers because they open up multinational tax plan-
ning opportunities. Specifically, SA is criticized since it implies that multinationals
which face international differences in corporate taxation minimize their tax burden
by shifting taxable profits to low-tax countries (for a survey on empirical evidence see
Devereux, 2006). This puts pressure on the corporate taxation system since high-tax
countries face substantial revenue losses and multinational profit-shifting opportunities
discriminate against companies that operate on a domestic scale only.
As a possible alternative to SA, a system of profit consolidation in combination with
formula apportionment (FA) is discussed (e.g., Weltzer, 1995, and Mintz, 1999), which
is applied at the subnational level in several countries, for example, in the US, Canada,
Germany and Switzerland. The debate about relative merits of FA versus SA has re-
cently been intensified in the European context, where the European Commission in
2001 proposed to introduce FA within EU borders (see Fuest, 2008, for a discussion
of the reform’s details). Under FA, profit is consolidated at the group level and ap-
portioned to the affiliates according to a formula that measures the affiliates’ relative
corporate activities. Theoretically, group-wide consolidation should thereby abolish
profit-shifting incentives. This effect is often perceived as a major advantage of apply-
ing FA.
Contrary to this presumption, our paper shows that profit-shifting incentives remain
important under FA. We argue that a particular problem faced by FA is that profit
shifting within the corporate group is only abolished if all group affiliates of the MJE
are consolidated. If MJEs, in contrast, have some leeway in deciding whether affiliates
are included in the basis of consolidation, they might strategically refrain from consol-
1See also the OECD Model Convention (OECD, 1992).
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idation to preserve profit-shifting opportunities. The appropriate group definition (i.e.
which affiliates belong to a corporate group) is a well-known problem in almost all FA
systems. In the US case, for example, a group is defined either by a legal criterion
(‘ownership share’) or by an economic criterion (‘unitary business’). Under the legal
group definition it is obvious that corporations can distort their ownership structure
in order to maintain profit-shifting channels to economically, but not legally, related
affiliates. Comparable manipulation opportunities seem to exist under the economic
group definition as is suggested by a large number of litigations in the US to determine
the relation of affiliates to corporate groups (e.g. Weiner, 2006).2
In order to address the strategic choice with regard to consolidation of affiliated firms,
we develop a simple theoretical model of a MJE that runs affiliates in two different
jurisdictions and that decides about whether or not to consolidate these affiliates. By
comparing the maximized after-tax profit under the two alternatives, we identify a
basic trade-off determining the consolidation decision. On the one hand, exclusion
of affiliates is associated with costs. This comprises costs caused by changes in the
corporate structure which lower the degree of economic and financial integration to
an extent that allows the MJE to tax an affiliate as a separate entity. For instance,
agency costs with regard to the management of the separate affiliate may arise. Also,
loss offset opportunities between the affiliates are reduced, so the expected tax burden
increases, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, non-consolidation has the benefit of
maintaining profit-shifting opportunities. This benefit, and thus the incentive for non-
consolidation, turns out to be the more important the larger the dispersion of statutory
tax rates within the whole corporate group.
In a second step, we test empirically whether this characterization of a strategic con-
solidation decision can be used to predict the observed structure of consolidated firms.
Our testing ground is the German local business tax that is levied at the municipal
level and significantly contributes to the company tax burden in Germany. If a MJE
2There exist many alternative criteria used to determine whether an affiliate economically belongs
to a group or not. While it is undisputed that such criteria improve the group definition for tax
purpose, the scientific debate about the pros and cons of the criteria suggests that they are not
perfect and still prone to tax-planning activities of MJEs (e.g. Weiner, 2006).
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holds affiliates in several municipalities, an FA scheme applies that renders group profit
to be consolidated at the national level and prescribes apportionment according to the
affiliates’ relative payroll shares. However, as in the US case, at least in the time period
analyzed below, the German FA scheme applies only conditional on appropriate legal,
financial, and economic ties between the entities. Since a group’s ownership pattern as
well as the economic and financial connections are outcomes of firm decisions, MJEs
enjoy some discretion with regard to the inclusion of affiliates in the unitary tax assess-
ment and may thus – within certain boundaries – choose whether affiliates are subject
to SA or FA regulations.
To identify tax determinants of the MJEs’ choice of the consolidated group, we exploit
a quasi experiment that arises from a recent change in the German tax law associated
with a comprehensive company tax reform in 2001. This reform significantly reduced
the cost associated with non-consolidation under the business tax because loss-offset
opportunities have been enhanced even for those firms that are not-consolidated. Given
the reduction in the cost of non-consolidation, the reform allows us to test whether,
in fact, consolidated firms that face significant profit-shifting opportunities tend to
reorganize in a way that is consistent with a strategic choice of consolidation.
The empirical analysis employs a unique dataset that comprises confidential tax return
data for the whole population of firms subject to the German local business tax in the
years 1998 and 2001. Our results indicate behavioral patterns that are in line with our
theoretical predictions. More specifically, MJEs with a large variation in business-tax
rates across group affiliates display a reduction in the number of consolidated affiliates
between 1998 and 2001 compared to MJEs with a small variation in tax rates across
group affiliates. This result turns out to be robust against the inclusion of various
control variables, characterizing the corporate group and the economic conditions in
the hosting communities. Evaluated at the sample mean, we find that an increase in
the variance of the statutory tax-rates among the affiliates of an MJE by one standard
deviation reduces the number of consolidated affiliates by 20%. This sizeable effect
points to an important strategic component in the MJEs’ consolidation decision.
Our paper mainly adds to two strands of the economic literature. First, it contributes
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to the discussion of the pros and cons of different corporate taxation schemes for MJEs.
The comparison of SA and FA goes back to early papers by McLure (1980) and Gor-
don and Wilson (1986) who show that FA may lead to distortions in firm behavior
similar to SA. Recent papers by Anand and Sansing (2000), Eggert and Schjelderup
(2003), Sørensen (2004), Wellisch (2004), Kind et al. (2005), Nielsen et al. (2006),
Riedel and Runkel (2007), Pinto (2007), Pethig and Wagener (2008) and Eichner and
Runkel (2008) focus on the welfare implications of corporate taxation under SA and
FA. Moreover, although the empirical evidence is still limited, the recent years have
seen the emergence of a literature that empirically quantifies the distortions and eco-
nomic outcomes of corporate taxation under FA. Examples are papers by Goolsbee
and Maydew (2000), Buettner (2003), Mintz and Smart (2004), Fuest et al. (2007) and
Riedel (2008). Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge neither the existing theo-
retical nor the existing empirical papers have analyzed the endogenous consolidation
decision of MJEs under FA.
Additionally, our paper relates to a small literature that investigates how corporate
taxation distorts the organizational structure of MJEs. Desai et al. (2004) analyze
the determinants of partial ownership of foreign US affiliates. Their evidence indicates
that whole ownership is most common when firms benefit from worldwide tax planning
opportunities. Weichenrieder and Smart (2007) in turn provide evidence that MJEs
distort the corporate organizational structure by using conduit and holding companies
to reduce their corporate tax burden. Huizinga and Voget (2006) present results that
indicate ownership patterns within multinational entities to be determined by profit tax
rates and withholding taxes. Bucovetsky and Haufler (2008) discuss the consequences
of preferential tax regimes for multinationals when firms can choose their multinational
structure. However, also this literature does not focus on the consolidation decision of
MJEs under an apportionment taxation system.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model underlying
our estimation strategy which is explained in detail in Section 3. Section 4 contains a
description of the data and provides basic descriptive statistics. Section 5 outlines the
estimation methodology, Section 6 presents the results, and Section 7 concludes.
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2 A Simple Theoretical Model
In order to address the strategic choice of a MJE with regard to consolidation of
affiliated firms, we develop a simple model of the consolidation decision of a single
MJE. Suppose the MJE has affiliates in two jurisdictions. The jurisdictions are labeled
by a and b.3 Each affiliate earns the same before-tax profit denoted by pi. This before-
tax profit is treated as given, which amounts to assuming that the MJE has already
decided on its investment and employment in both affiliates.This assumption allows
us to focus on the consolidation decision of the MJE which is the main interest of our
analysis.
We consider corporate income taxation according to the FA principle with tax base
consolidation and unitary tax assessment. As already discussed in the Introduction,
however, even under such a taxation system MJEs have some discretion with regard to
the inclusion of affiliates into the consolidated group. Put differently, the MJEs have
in fact some choice between FA and SA taxation. This choice is explicitly considered
in our theoretical model, that is concerned with the strategic decision of the MJE to
consolidate the two affiliates (FA) or not (SA).
On the one hand, the MJE will incur additional costs γ > 0 if it does not consolidate
the affiliates. These non-consolidation costs arise, for example, from changes in the
corporate structure that are necessary in order to run an affiliate as a separate entity
for tax purposes. In the institutional context of the empirical analysis below, the MJE
would have to change the organizational, economic, and financial integration of the
firms. As a consequence, agency costs with regard to the management of the affiliates
may arise. Also, loss-offset opportunities between the consolidated group and the
separated affiliate will be reduced which increases the expected tax burden.
On the other hand, when the two affiliates are not consolidated, the MJE may shift
profit from one jurisdiction to the other. Typical channels of profit shifting involve
the manipulation of transfer prices of intra-firm trade, the use of internal debt and
3Note that for our purpose, it is irrelevant whether the headquarter of the MJE is located in
jurisdiction a or jurisdiction b.
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the manipulation of the distribution of overhead cost (e.g., Devereux, 2006). However,
since the specific channel of profit shifting is immaterial for our purpose, we simply
consider the total amount of profit shifted – denoted by s. If s > 0, the MJE shifts
profit from jurisdiction a to jurisdiction b. For s < 0 shifting takes place the other way
round. Profit shifting is not costless to the MJE. It causes concealment costs denoted
by C(s). These costs reflect, for example, the MJE’s expenses for tax lawyers or the
risk of additional tax payments if tax authorities deny deductions. The concealment
cost function satisfies sign{C ′(s)} = sign{s} and C ′′(s) > 0, i.e. it is U-shaped with
the minimum at the point where the MJE forgoes profit shifting. Moreover, we assume
C(0) = 0 so that concealment costs are zero if the MJE does not engage in shifting.
The MJE will not consolidate if and only if the maximized net profit of doing so is
larger than in the case of consolidation. Hence, we have to compare the maximized net
profit in the two cases. Let us start with the case where the MJE does not consolidate.
The after-tax profit (before subtracting the non-consolidation cost γ) then reads
pis = (1− ta)(pi − s) + (1− tb)(pi + s)− C(s), (1)
where ta and tb represent the corporate tax rates of jurisdiction a and jurisdiction
b, respectively. Equation (1) shows that without consolidation the two affiliates are
taxed separately and the MJE may use profit shifting to increase the tax base in one
jurisdiction and reduce the tax base in the other jurisdiction. The first-order condition
with respect to optimal profit shifting s is given by
C ′(s) = ta − tb. (2)
Hence, the MJE determines profit shifting such that the marginal concealment cost
equals the marginal gain from profit shifting represented by the tax rate differential.
If jurisdiction a is the high-tax jurisdiction, the marginal concealment cost will be
positive and profit shifting takes place from jurisdiction a to jurisdiction b (s > 0). If
jurisdiction b is the high-tax jurisdiction, profit shifting will be the other way round
(s < 0). Equation (2) determines the MJE’s optimal profit shifting as function of the
tax rate differential, i.e. s = S(ta − tb) with S ′(ta − tb) = 1/C ′′ > 0. Profit shifting
is therefore higher the larger the tax rate differential between the two jurisdiction.
6
Inserting into (1) gives the MJE’s maximized after-tax profit
pi∗s = (2− ta − tb)pi + (ta − tb)S(ta − tb)− C[S(ta − tb)]. (3)
In order to obtain the net payoff of the MJE in case of non-consolidation, we have to
subtract from (3) the non-consolidation cost γ.
If the MJE consolidates its affiliates, profit is taxed according to the FA principle. The
consolidated tax base equals 2pi. This consolidated tax base is assigned to the two
jurisdictions according to a formula that – in the practice of FA – may contain capital,
payroll, and/or sales shares of the MJE in the respective jurisdiction. Since we assume
that the MJE has already decided on investment and employment in both affiliates,
in our model the apportionment factors are fixed. More specifically, suppose the share
α ∈ [0, 1] of the consolidated tax base is assigned to jurisdiction a, while jurisdiction
b receives the share 1− α of the consolidated tax base. The MJE’s after-tax profit in
case of consolidation can then be written as
pif = 2pi[1− αta − (1− α)tb]− C(s). (4)
Because tax bases are consolidated, there is no gain from shifting profit from one
affiliate to the other. Thus, the MJE simply chooses the amount of profit shifting that
minimizes concealment costs, i.e. s = 0 so C(s) = 0. Inserting into Equation (4) yields
pi∗f = 2pi[1− αta − (1− α)tb]. (5)
Equation (5) gives the MJE’s maximized profit in the case where it decides to consol-
idate the two affiliates.
In order to characterize the MJE’s consolidation decision we have to compare the
expression for the maximized profit in Equations (3) and (5), taking into account the
non-consolidation cost γ. Hence, the MJE will not consolidate if and only if
pi∗s − γ > pi∗f , (6)
or, equivalently,
2pi
[
ta + tb
2
− αta − (1− α) tb
]
< (ta − tb)S(ta − tb)− C[S(ta − tb)]− γ. (7)
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With the simplifying assumption that the tax burden without profit shifting is the same
under SA and FA4, i.e. (ta + tb)/2 = αta + (1− α) tb, this condition can be expressed
as
(ta − tb)S(ta − tb)− C[S(ta − tb)] > γ. (8)
This inequality states that the MJE will not consolidate if the total gain from profit
shifting (LHS) exceeds the consolidation costs (RHS). It is immediately seen that the
gain from profit shifting on the LHS is U-shaped in the tax differential with a minimum
at the point where the tax rate differential vanishes.5 Hence, we obtain the following
Proposition. Consolidation of the MJE becomes less likely the lower the non-con-
solidation costs γ and the higher the tax rate differential ta − tb in absolute terms.
The intuition of the result with respect to the decline in the non-consolidation costs γ
is obvious. With respect to the tax rate differential between the affiliates, it holds that
the larger this differential, the larger are the MJE’s gains from profit shifting activities,
and the advantage of taxing the affiliates separately becomes relatively more important
to the MJE than the non-consolidation costs.
3 Investigation Approach
According to the above theoretical discussion, if MJE’s have some leeway in deciding
whether affiliates are included in the basis of consolidation, this decision might be taken
strategically. While there will be important cost of non-consolidation, to run an affiliate
4It is well known that with endogenous apportionment factors the firms’ investment and employ-
ment decisions are distorted by consolidation and apportionment. See the studies referred to in the
Introduction. These distortions are absent in our model since we assume a fixed apportionment fac-
tor. Symmetry of the earned pre-tax profit pia = pib = pi suggests to set α = 1/2. We chose this
modeling strategy for expositional simplicity. It is straightforward to show that even with additional
distortions under FA our results hold due to the common perception that the relocation of pre-tax
profit to low-tax countries is substantially easier via profit shifting under SA than via a distortion of
the apportionment factors under FA (see e.g. Mintz and Smart (2004) for empirical evidence).
5Formally, define F (ta− tb) := (ta− tb)S(ta− tb)−C[S(ta− tb)]. Using (2) then yields F ′(ta− tb) =
S(ta − tb) T 0 if and only if ta − tb T 0.
8
as a separate firm for tax purposes might preserve important profit-shifting opportu-
nities. A decline in the non-consolidation costs is predicted to provide an incentive
to exclude affiliates from group consolidation, and this incentive will be particularly
relevant for MJEs facing large intra-group tax rate differentials.
To empirically test this prediction, we investigate FA in the context of the German
local business tax. This tax is levied at the municipal level while the tax law that de-
termines the tax base definition is chosen at the national level. Thus, local autonomy
is confined to setting the tax rate, tax administration including the tax apportionment
is the responsibility of the state government. Moreover, for MJEs, i.e. firms operating
affiliates in more than one municipality, a FA system with payroll apportionment ap-
plies. Accordingly, the MJE’s taxable income is consolidated at the national level and
is apportioned to the individual entities according to the relative payroll share.
Subject to the German local business tax are incorporated and un-incorporated firms,
as well as individual enterprises. The local business tax burden on profits allocated to a
municipality is determined by the municipality’s business tax rate. This is measured in
local business tax points and ranges from 0 to 900 points in our data, with an average
of 325 points. To calculate a firm’s actual tax burden, pre-tax profits are commonly
multiplied by a percentage value of 5% and by the municipality’s local business tax rate.
Taking account of the self-deductibility of the business tax, the resulting statutory tax
rate on profits varies between zero and 31%, with a mean of about 14%.
As with other FA systems, MJEs under the German local business tax scheme have
some discretion with regard to the decision whether to consolidate a certain affiliate or
not. The extent to which they may strategically manipulate the consolidation thereby
depends on the costs associated with separate assessment of a corporate affiliate (the
parameter γ in our theoretical model). As noted in the Introduction, legal and economic
restrictions play a critical role in this context. To separate out individual affiliates for
purposes of the business tax requires a re-organization of the group with respect to
the ownership structure and the economic and financial relations between the entities.
This re-organization is associated not only with adjustment cost but may also reduce
the efficiency of management processes and increase agency costs with regard to the
9
management of the separated affiliates. Moreover, separating out affiliates implies that
full loss offset is no longer possible. If an affiliate is consolidated within a corporate
group and earns a negative profit, theses losses completely offset the positive profits
earned by other affiliates in the calculation of the MJE’s local business tax bill. In
contrast, if an affiliate is not consolidated under FA regulations and experiences losses,
these may not offset profits earned elsewhere and hence they do not reduce the MJE’s
tax burden. To separate out individual affiliates is therefore particularly costly as these
loss-offset opportunities are limited under SA, if not completely ruled out.
Against this background, the empirical analysis exploits an exogeneous variation in
the German tax law that significantly reduced the costs associated with taxing an
affiliate as a separate firm for purposes of the local business tax. In 2001, the German
government implemented a broad company tax reform. Although the reform did not
directly alter the consolidation rules for the purposes of the local business tax, it
provided German MJEs with new opportunities for loss offset also with firms that are
not consolidated for purposes of the local business tax and taxed as separate entities.6
The creation of the enhanced loss-offset opportunities thus decreased significantly the
cost of strategically separating some of their affiliates from the rest of the group for
purposes of the local business tax. Put differently, after the reform the MJE may on
the one hand reap tax savings from a separate assessment of affiliates for local business
tax purposes by exploiting profit-shifting opportunities. On the other hand, due to
the reform this separate assessment does not automatically imply that the MJE has to
6This effect of the 2001 reform arises due to the interaction between the consolidation rules for
the federal corporation tax and the local business tax. Prior to 2001, the consolidation regulations
were basically the same for purposes of both the federal corporation tax and the local business tax
requiring a substantial financial, organizational, and economic integration (see Herzig, 2003). In 2001,
however, consolidation requirements for purposes of the federal corporation tax have been facilitated
substantially, while the requirements for the business tax remained unchanged. This opened up the
opportunity to reorganize the MJE and separate out affiliates for local business tax purposes while
consolidating for the calculation of the federal corporate income tax (e.g., Kirsch and Grube, 2001).
A subsequent reform in 2002 then synchronized the consolidation rules for the local business tax with
the relaxed regulations for federal corporate tax purposes (Herzig, 2003). While this has facilitated
the choice between FA and SA and has opened up further profit-shifting opportunities (e.g., Raedler,
2003) the partial loss-offset opportunity that was created by the 2001 reform was abolished.
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forgo all benefits from a loss-offset between its affiliates.
Presuming, therefore, that the cost of excluding affiliates from a group’s basis of consol-
idation has been lowered substantially in 2001, we predict, in line with the theoretical
analysis, that the incentive to exclude affiliates increases with profit-shifting opportu-
nities that arise from statutory tax-rate differentials within the group.
4 Data Set and Sample Statistics
We test for strategic consolidation using a unique dataset provided by the German
Statistical Offices at the federal and state level. The data contains the confidential tax
return data for the whole population of German corporations that are subject to local
business taxation. The information is gathered directly from German tax authorities
and is available for the years 1998 and 2001.
The dataset comprises all German corporations that are liable to the local business tax
and includes information about the capital stock, payroll, industry, multi-jurisdictional
status (multi-jurisdictional vs. uni-jurisdictional firms), legal form (incorporated vs.
un-incorporated firms), taxable profits and characteristics of the firms’ hosting loca-
tions. Since we are interested in investigating corporate tax effects on the MJEs’
consolidation decision, we restrict our attention to entities which operate affiliates in-
cluding branches in several communities and are henceforth subject to FA regulations.7
One major advantage of the data is that it allows us to identify all group affiliates which
are consolidated under FA regulations. In order to determine tax effects on the number
of consolidated affiliates between 1998 and 2001, we restrict attention to those MJEs
for which data is available for both sample years. The resulting dataset covers 50, 342
groups.8
7Note, however, that affiliates and branches may both be consolidated with the group or taxed
separately under FA regulations.
8The cross sections for 1998 and 2001 are linked by the respective group’s tax account identifier
which may potentially change over time, mainly in the course of tax office restructuring or headquarter
relocations to other jurisdictions or in larger cities even through the relocation to other quarters. While
11
Table 1 presents basic sample statistics for the corporate groups in our data set. In
1998, the average number of affiliates which are consolidated under FA rules is cal-
culated with 4.1 affiliates for the MJEs in our data set. Between 1998 and 2001 this
number increases by 0.11. Calculating the average growth rate in the number of consol-
idated affiliates for the same time period yields a figure of 5.47%. This average trend in
firm numbers possibly reflects a host of different trends in the German economy. This
includes the macroeconomic performance of the German economy, structural changes
in the industry composition, but also business cycle effects will be important.
However, our theory suggests that given the reduction in the cost of non-consolidation
the development in the number of consolidated affiliates should also depend on the op-
portunities for profit shifting under non-consolidation. Specifically, the rate of growth
in this time period should be inversely related to the variation in the local business tax
rates across affiliates since this determines the potential gains from profit shifting. To
measure the variation of the statutory tax rates, we employ two alternative indicators.
First, we calculate the variance of the distribution of the business tax rate within each
multi-jurisdictional group prior to the reform in 1998. The average variance measure in
local business tax points is thereby determined to be 950.35 and exhibits a considerable
variation across groups. Second, we define a measure of the tax-rate variation that is
calculated as the ratio of the business tax points at the 90th percentile of the group’s
tax distribution over the business tax points at the 10th percentile of the group’s tax
distribution in 1998. The average of this measure is calculated with 1.1534 and indi-
cates that the business tax rate at the 90th percentile of the tax distribution exceeds
the tax rate at the 10th percentile by a factor of 1.15.
We also control for characteristics of the groups’ hosting municipalities as well as for
several firm characteristics. The sample statistics for these variables are also presented
in Table 1. The calculation of averages for hosting municipalities’ characteristics is
based on data from the German Statistical Offices’ REGIOSTAT data base. We calcu-
late unweighted average values for the number of inhabitants, the number of employees
and the average unemployment rate for affiliates of an MJE in 1998. Table 1 indicates
this results in a reduction of the sample size it mainly constitutes random sample selection that is
innocuous for our analysis.
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that the multi-jurisdictional groups in our dataset are on average located in relatively
large municipalities with 104, 423 inhabitants and 48, 516 employees, and face an un-
employment rate of 12.9%.
Moreover, the groups’ average capital stock in 1998 is calculated with 8.3 million
Deutsche Mark (DM) or, approximately, 4 million Euros. The MJEs’ average pre-tax
profits in turn are substantially lower and measured with 56, 467 DM. Additionally, the
descriptive statistics indicate a considerable heterogeneity between the consolidated af-
filiates of the MJEs in our sample with respect to size, profitability, and apportionment
shares. Analogous to the calculation of the intra-group tax spreading measures, we em-
ploy two measures, the variance and the ratio of the 90th over the 10th percentile of
the intra-firm distribution, in order to capture how the capital stock, pre-tax profits,
the relative payroll shares, and capital intensity vary across group affiliates in 1998.
Since the variance calculation exhibits similar findings, Table 1 in the Appendix re-
ports the descriptive statistics for the 90/10 ratio only. The 90/10 ratio of the affiliates’
capital stock points to a considerable heterogeneity between affiliates. A similar pic-
ture emerges with regard to the variation of pre-tax profits, the relative payroll share,
and the capital intensity in 1998. All reported ratios are relatively large and thus
indicate that the groups in our data set comprise very heterogeneous affiliates which
substantially differ with regard to size, profitability and capital intensity of production.
5 Estimation Methodology
Based on the data set described in the previous section, we empirically assess whether
- in line with our theory - a large variation in statutory tax rates across multi-
jurisdictional affiliates is indeed associated with a tendency to exclude affiliates from
consolidation in 2001, when the cost of non-consolidation have been decreased substan-
tially. Formally, we estimate the following model
n̂i = β0 + β1vi + β2 log ni + β3xi + i (9)
whereas n̂i depicts the growth rate in the number of consolidated affiliates of MJE i
between 1998 and 2001 and vi symbolizes the intra-firm corporate tax rate variation in
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1998. Rather than predicting the number of firms in 2001, the model is concerned with
the development of the number of affiliates relative to the base year 1998. As explained
in the previous section, we employ two alternative measures to capture the tax rate
distribution within a group: the group’s tax-rate variance in 1998 and the ratio of the
business tax rate at the 90th percentile of the intra-firm tax distribution in 1998 over
the business tax rate at the 10th percentile. Our model predicts that the larger the
variation in the statutory tax rates across affiliates the larger are possible profit-shifting
gains if affiliates are taxed separately from the rest of the corporate group. Hence, we
expect β1 < 0.
Our analysis controls for several group characteristics. Thus, we include the number
of affiliates ni that are consolidated under FA regulations in 1998. Additionally, we
account for various other variables that may exert an influence on the growth rate of the
number of consolidated group affiliates. Since size and profitability may be important,
we include each group’s stock of capital, profitability, and capital intensity in 1998 as
control variables. To account for structural differences between groups, we include a
full set of industry dummies at the two-digit NACE code and dummies for different
legal forms (individual firms, non-incorporated firms and incorporated firms).
Moreover, we control for average characteristics of the MJE’s hosting communities
like the number of inhabitants, the number of employees and the unemployment rate
in 1998. These variables capture some characteristics at the local or regional level,
that might well be correlated with the change in firms numbers. Finally, it seems
reasonable to control for the variation in other firm characteristics across subsidiaries to
test whether the estimated effect simply picks up other types of heterogeneity between
affiliates. Thus, we include control variables in our estimation equation for the variation
in the affiliates’ relative payroll share in 1998 as well as for the variation in capital stock,
pre-tax profits, and capital intensity across affiliates in 1998. The calculation of these
measures of variation thereby follows the calculation methodology for the tax-rate
variable. Hence, as a measure of the variation we calculate the variance across group
affiliates and the ratio of the 90th over the 10th percentile of the variable’s intra-group
distribution.
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In our baseline regression, we estimate Equation (9) based on OLS methodology. How-
ever, the change in the number of consolidated affiliates is small for most groups in
our sample. More than 50% of the groups in our sample do not observe a change
in the number of consolidated affiliates between 1998 and 2001 and less than 10% of
the groups observe a change in the number of consolidated affiliates by more than 1.
This suggests to check whether the results are robust against the use of an alternative
limited-dependent variable model. For this purpose we construct a categorial variable
depicting whether the number of affiliates has increased, stayed constant, or declined
and apply an ordered probit model.
6 Results
This section presents our estimation results. Throughout all regressions the unit of
observation is the multi-jurisdictional group. Table 2 displays the results of our base-
line OLS regression where the tax-rate variation vi is captured by the variance across
consolidated group affiliates. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Specification (1) regresses the growth rate
in the number of consolidated affiliates on the group’s tax-rate variance and on the
number of consolidated group affiliates in 1998. As predicted by theory, the variance
of the statutory tax rates exerts a significantly negative influence on the number of
consolidated affiliates. Evaluated at the sample mean, the coefficient estimate suggests
that an increase in the tax variance measure by one standard deviation reduces the
growth rate of the number of consolidated affiliates by 17%.9
In specification (2) we additionally account for industry dummies to capture industry
specific differences in the development of affiliate numbers. In specification (3) we
include a full set of control variables for the groups’ legal form and a dummy variable
that captures effects of so called integrated corporate groups which do not only comprise
9An increase in the tax variance measure by one standard deviation (= 1631.8, cf. Table 1)
reduces the growth rate of the number of consolidated affiliates by 0.95 percentage points (= 1631.8 ·
0.0583/10, 000, cf. Specification (1) of Table 2). Relative to the average growth rate in the number of
consolidated affiliates of (= 5.47%, cf. Table 1), this corresponds to a reduction of 17%.
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branches but also incorporated affiliates. Specifications (4) to (6) add controls for the
group’s size, productivity and capital intensity. Larger corporate groups (measured
in terms of the total capital stock) display a higher growth rate of affiliate numbers.
Moreover, specification (5) shows that the larger the group profit the larger is the
growth rate in affiliate numbers. In contrast, a high capital intensity is associated with a
decline of the number of affiliates. The inclusion of these control characteristics renders
the coefficient estimate for the number of consolidated affiliates in 1998 negative and
statistically significant suggesting that corporations with a larger number of affiliates
grow at a lower rate, ceteris paribus. This might indicate that group level variables
such as profits matter relative to the number of firms involved, or it might just reflect a
stochastic mean-reversion effect. Specification (7) further controls for differences in the
local economic conditions, employing averages of hosting jurisdictions’ characteristics.
More precisely, we account for the number of inhabitants, the number of employees
and the unemployment rate in 1998. Only the coefficient estimate for the average
employment variable suggests a marginally significant positive influence on the growth
rate of the number of affiliates, the coefficient estimates for the other control variables
remain statistically insignificant. At any rate, though, the inclusion of the additional
controls do not affect the coefficient estimate for the tax-rate variance, that also remains
statistically significant suggesting that an increase in the variance of the tax rate by
one standard deviation reduces the growth rate of the number of consolidated affiliates
by 22.4%.
In specification (8) we further check whether the coefficient for the variance of the
tax rate simply picks up variation of other firm characteristics like size or profitability
that may be correlated with the variation of tax rates across affiliates as well as with
the growth rate in the group’s number of consolidated affiliates. The estimate for
the variance in the size of the capital stock thereby suggests that the variance in
affiliate size exerts a statistically significant positive effect on the growth rate of the
number of consolidated affiliates. This indicates that groups which comprise rather
heterogeneous affiliates in terms of size in 1998 are more likely to increase the number
of consolidated affiliates. The coefficient estimate for the variance in affiliate profits
exhibits a statistically significant negative effect. This might indicate that with a strong
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variation in profitability between affiliates in 1998, the MJE may have an incentive to
shut down the relatively unprofitable subsidiaries. However, an alternative explanation,
in line with the theoretical model above, is that MJEs with a larger variance in terms
of profits that have avoided separate accounting before the reform in order to gain
from the possibility of loss offset are now re-organizing. This directly translates into a
reduction in the growth rate of affiliate numbers. A similar explanation applies to the
negative significant effect of the variation in the affiliates’ capital intensity. However,
the coefficient estimate for the variation of the tax rates again remains stable and
statistically significant. Evaluated at the sample mean, the coefficient estimate suggests
that an increase in the tax variance measure by one standard deviation reduces the
affiliate growth rate by 22.8%.
So far, our analysis employed the variance of the local business tax-rates across affiliates
in order to capture the MJEs’ profit shifting opportunities under non-consolidation. To
check whether our results are robust against alternative measures of the tax rate dis-
tribution, we re-estimate the specifications in Table 2 employing the ratio of the 90th
over the 10th percentile of a group’s tax rate distribution. The larger this tax measure,
the higher is the variation in the tax rate distribution within the corporate group in
1998 and the lower the growth rate in the number of affiliates should be. This pre-
sumption is strongly confirmed by the estimation results presented in Table 3. The
coefficient estimate for the measure of the tax-rate dispersion is negative and statis-
tically significant at the 1% level suggesting that an increase in this indicator by one
standard deviation reduces the growth rate of the number of consolidated affiliates by
15.0%. Specifications (2) to (8) show that this result is robust against the inclusion of
the control variables employed above which also carry the above detected signs. The
coefficient estimate in specification (8) indicates that an increase in the tax-rate dis-
persion measure by one standard deviation reduces the growth rate of affiliate numbers
by 20.7%.10 Thus, the estimated effect is quantitatively close to the effect found on
the basis of the tax variance measure.
10Note that the dispersion measures for affiliate characteristics (e.g. capital stock and profit levels)
which are included in specification (8), are calculated as the ratio of the 90th percentile of the intra-
group distribution over the 10th percentile of the intra-group distribution to be consistent with the
calculation of the measure of the tax-rate variation.
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As pointed out in Section 4, the empirical distribution of the relative change in the
number of consolidated affiliates between 1998 and 2001 suggests that a limited de-
pendent variable model might be a reasonable alternative to OLS. We, therefore, also
provide results based on an ordered probit model that is concerned with three values
of the dependent variable: ‘affiliate number decreased’ (= 1), ‘affiliate number stayed
constant’ (= 2) and ‘affiliate number increased’ (= 3).
The local business tax-rate variation across group affiliates is captured by the ratio of
the 90th over the 10th percentile of the tax distribution (employing the local business
tax variance leads to comparable results). The results are presented in Table 4. Spec-
ifications (1) to (8) resemble the estimations presented in Tables 2 and 3. We again
find the same picture in the sense that the dispersion measure exerts a statistically
significant negative impact on the change in affiliate numbers. The control variables
also show the same signs as above. In a second step, we additionally experiment with
alternative categorizations of the dependent variable (e.g. the use of five categories)
and found that the results prove robust against alternative specifications.11
We conclude from our empirical analysis that the evidence supports our theoretical
prediction. MJEs experiencing a large variation in the tax rate distribution among
affiliates are found to have reduced the number of consolidated affiliates compared
with MJEs with a low variation of tax rates across affiliates. This corresponds to
the view that the former groups can generate larger profit shifting gains under non-
consolidation and thus reduce their affiliate numbers more strongly in response to the
legal change in German tax law in 2001.
7 Conclusion
While separate-accounting (SA) rules govern the taxation of multinational enterprises
in the current system of international taxation, these rule are often criticized since
they give rise to profit-shifting opportunities. As an alternative, a system of profit
11The results of these estimations are available from the authors upon request.
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consolidation combined with some formulary apportionment (FA) has been suggested in
the literature emphasizing that group-wide consolidation would abolish profit-shifting
incentives. However, our paper shows that profit-shifting incentives remain important
under FA. We argue that a particular problem faced by FA is that profit shifting within
the corporate group is only abolished if all group affiliates of a multijurisidictional
enterprise (MJE) are consolidated. Since the rules that determine the consolidated
group usually rest on the degree of economic and financial integration which ultimately
reflect firm decisions, MJE will experience some leeway in deciding whether affiliates
are included in the basis of consolidation. As a consequence, consolidation becomes a
strategic tool for an MJE’s tax planning.
To analyze strategic consolidation we develop a theoretical model of an MJE that runs
affiliates in different jurisdictions and that decides about whether or not to consolidate
these affiliates. By comparing the maximized after-tax profit under the two alterna-
tives, we identify a basic trade-off determining the consolidation decision. On the one
hand, we note that exclusion of affiliates is associated with costs, notably, loss offset
opportunities cannot be exploited. On the other hand, non-consolidation has the ben-
efit of maintaining profit-shifting opportunities. This benefit, and thus the incentive
for non-consolidation, turns out to be the more important the larger the dispersion of
statutory tax rates within the whole corporate group.
The empirical analysis provides evidence that MJEs which are taxed according to
FA regulations do, in fact, strategically exclude affiliates from consolidation. The
analysis uses a unique firm-level data set that comprises confidential tax-return data
for the whole population of German firms in 1998 and 2001. To identify the strategic
consolidation decision, we make use of an exogeneous variation in the German tax law
which came into effect in January 2001 and reduced the costs of excluding affiliates
from the basis of consolidation under the German local business tax system.
Our estimation results confirm the theoretical prediction and suggest that an increase
in the variation of tax rates within a corporate group by one standard deviation reduces
the growth rate of the number of consolidated affiliates by around 20%. This finding
is stable for a large set of specifications and robustness checks.
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The paper thus indicates that MJEs tend to strategically exclude affiliates from consoli-
dation under FA to preserve profit shifting opportunities within the multi-jurisdictional
group. However, if profit shifting channels to unconsolidated group affiliates remain
open, this may - at least to some extent - undermine the effectiveness of the FA system
in abolishing profit shifting activities. Thus, as a direct policy implication our paper
suggests that the design of FA regimes should attach large costs to excluding affiliates
from the basis of consolidation. Otherwise MJEs tend to leave affiliates in low-tax ju-
risdictions un-consolidated and engage in profit shifting activities despite the existence
of a FA regime. Again, the German case offers some example. After a series of reforms
that have relaxed the rules for consolidation, starting with the reform that the above
analysis has addressed, tax authorities faced increasing problems to suppress profit-
shifting at the subnational level, despite the implementation of FA. In 2004, then, the
federal legislator in Germany took resort to defining a minimum tax rate for the local
business tax.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Affiliate Numbers
Difference Number of Affiliates 2001-1998 0.1077 11.3994
Growth Rate Number of Affiliates 2001-1998 0.0547 0.6298
Number of Affiliates 1998 4.1330 49.2584
Measures of Tax-Rate Variation
Tax Variance 1998 (in Local Business Tax Points) 950.3482 1631.7570
90th / 10th Percentile, Tax Rate 1.1534 0.1627
Other Jurisdictional Characteristics
Inhabitants 1998 104, 423.8 152, 840.5
Employment 1998 48, 516.4 78, 396.7
Unemployment Rate 1998 0.1295 0.0456
Group Characteristics
Capital 1998 (in 1,000 DM*) 8, 363.0 414, 000.0
Pre-tax Profit 1998 (in 1,000 DM*) 56.5 1, 791.9
Capital Intensity 1998 657.5 84, 672.4
90th / 10th Percentile, Capital 1998 1140.0 110, 603.4
90th / 10th Percentile, Pre-tax Profit 1998 37.7 709.7
90th / 10th Percentile, Relative Wages 1998 2617.2 277, 360.5
90th / 10th Percentile, Capital Intensity 1998 591.2 175, 942.9
* DM is the abbreviation for ’Deutsche Mark’, i.e. the German currency prior to the introduction of
the Euro. The exchange rate Deutsche Mark to Euro is approximately 2:1.
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